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Abstract 
In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ 
Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis h is confirmed by a 
statement e, h is confirmed by the disjunction e ∨ f, for whatever statement f. 
I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a pa-
per apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty. 
A simple formulation of Hypothetico-deductivism states that, if h is a 
hypothesis and e an evidential statement: 
(HD) e confirms h if (1) e is true, (2) h and ~e are each consistent, and (3) h ⊢ e [i.e. h entails e].1 (Grimes 1990, 520). 
(HD) implies the following rule: 
(TDP) If e confirms h in accordance with (HD), then the disjunction e ∨ f 
will also confirm h where f is any arbitrary statement that is not en-
tailed by ~e. (Ibid.) 
Consider in fact that, if e confirms h in accordance with (HD), h entails e, 
thus, by the rule of the introduction of disjunction, (3) h entails e ∨ f too. 
Moreover, if e confirms h in accordance with (HD) and f is not entailed by 
~e, (2) h and ~(e ∨ f) prove each consistent. Thus, if (1) e ∨ f is true, in 
accordance with (HD), e ∨ f confirms h.  
 (TDP) is problematic, first of all, because it can make h’s confirmation 
depend on the verification of statements that are intuitively irrelevant for 
 
1 Notice that, if (2) h and ~e are each consistent and (3) h entails e, then h 
and e must be contingent. This makes them liable to confirm and to be confirmed. 
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such a confirmation. Let us suppose, for example, that h is Newton’s 
Mechanics, e is its consequence that a certain body A, if dropped, falls in 
accordance with the Free-Fall Law, and f is the statement ‘my name is 
John.’ In this case, since e confirms h in accordance with (HD) and f is not 
entailed by ~e, on the grounds of (TDP), e ∨ f confirms h. Consider now 
the case in which e has not been verified and my name is in fact John. 
Because of the truth of f, e ∨ f is true too. Thus, given (TDP), Newton’s 
Mechanics is confirmed by the fact that my name is John, which is hardly 
acceptable.  
 Indeed, there are even more counterintuitive cases of confirmation 
allowed by (TDP). Let us suppose that h – i.e. Newton’s Mechanics – 
entails two statements e1 and e2, where both of them confirm h in accor-
dance with (HP). e1 says again that the body A falls in accordance with the 
Free-Fall Law and e2 says that another body B falls the same way. Consider 
now the disjunction e1 ∨ ~e2. Since ~e2 is not entailed by ~e1 and e1 con-
firms h in accordance with (HD), given (TDP), the disjunction e ∨ ~e2 
will confirm h too. This means that, if ~e2 is true, h is confirmed. But this 
is just absurd, as h entails the logical negation of ~e2. 
 Grimes believes that ‘the basic idea underlying the [… hypothetico-
deductive] method is that a hypothesis is confirmed if part of its content, 
part of what it asserts about the world, is shown to be true.’ (Grimes 
1990, 517). On the other hand, according to him, in the paradoxical 
confirmation cases allowed by (HD), ‘though h will entail the disjunction e 
∨ f if h entails e, the disjunction seems not to be part of the content of h.’ 
(Grimes 1990, 520). Grimes is thus persuaded that the tacking by dis-
junction problem can be settled if (HD) is replaced by a rule closer to the 
basic hypothetico-deductivist idea that a hypothesis is confirmed if part of 
its content is shown to be true. 
 To articulate his solution, Grimes formulates Hypothetico-
deductivism by resorting to the notion of a disjunction in Boolean normal 
form and the notion of a narrow consequence. As Grimes explains: 
Each disjunct of a disjunction in Boolean normal form consists of a conjunc-
tion which includes in alphabetical order exactly one occurrence of each 
atomic expression or its negation (but not both) that occurs in the larger dis-
junction, where no two disjuncts are the same. For example, (p & q) ∨ (~p & 
q) ∨ (~p & ~q) is a disjunction in Boolean normal form that is equivalent to 
the conditional p ⊃ q. (Grimes 1990, footnote 4, 520). 
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Grimes then defines the notion of a narrow consequence, represented by 
the symbol ‘6’, as follows: 
p 6 q =df p and ~q are each consistent and there is a disjunction d1 ∨ … ∨ dk 
in Boolean normal form such that (i) ⊢ q ≡ (d1 ∨ … ∨ dk), and (ii) for some 
di, p ⊢ di. (Grimes 1990, 520). 
According to Grimes, ‘the notion of a narrow consequence seems better 
suited [than that of a logical consequence] for expressing a relation of 
preserving content.’ (Grimes 1990, 520). 
 Eventually, Grimes formulates Hypothetico-deductivism in terms of 
this principle: 
(HD1) e confirms h if (1) e is true, (2) h and ~e are each consistent, and 
(3) h 6 e.2 (Ibid.) 
 Grimes’ solution of the tacking by disjunction problem is apparently 
efficacious. Let us suppose, for instance, that d, e and f are atomic expres-
sions, that h ≡df d & e, and that h and ~ (e ∨ f) are each consistent. Notice 
that, in this case, the verification of f is surely irrelevant for h’s confirma-
tion. Since h entails e and e entails e ∨ f, h entails e ∨ f too. However, this 
disjunction is not a narrow consequence of h. For e ∨ f is equivalent to the 
disjunction in Boolean form (e & f) ∨ (~e & f) ∨ (e & ~f), where h entails 
none of these disjuncts. Since the requirement (3) of (HD1) is not ful-
filled, e ∨ f does not confirm h. More generally, Grimes’ solution depends 
on the fact that the rule of the introduction of the disjunction does not 
hold on the notion of strict consequence. Thus, if h 6 e, it is not true 
that, for every f, h 6 e ∨ f. 
 Grimes’ proposal has surely the merit of being very intuitive, simple 
and elegant. If it worked, it could probably be preferred to other at-
tempted solutions available in literature now, which are more complex.3 
Unfortunately, Grimes’ solution is faulty. The trouble with (HD1)4 is that, 
though it does not entail the problematic rule (TDP), it cannot dismiss at 
 
2 If (2) h and ~e are each consistent and (3) e is a strict consequence of h 
(thus h entails e), h and e are contingent and liable to confirm and to be con-
firmed. 
3 See for instance Kuipers (2000, 17-27). 
4 Unnoticed in the substantially positive review of Grimes’ paper made by 
Skyrms 1992. 
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least some of the most counterintuitive confirmation cases, allowed by 
(TDP), that I have discussed above. (HD1) in fact entails that: 
(TDP1) If e1 and e2 are atomic sentences that confirm h in accordance with 
(HD1), then the disjunction e1 ∨ ~e2 will also confirm h if ~e2 is 
not entailed by ~e1.5 
(HD1) implies (TDP1) because e1 ∨ ~e2 is equivalent to the disjunction in 
Boolean normal form (e1 & ~e2) ∨ (~e1 & ~e2) ∨ (e1 & e2), where the last 
disjunct is entailed by h. For h implies, by assumption, both e1 and e2.6 
 The problems affecting Grimes’ solution are indeed more serious. For 
the notion of a narrow consequence of a theory is meant, by Grimes, to 
express ‘a relation of preserving content’, but it is evident that it does not 
do. The reason is that the disjunction e1 ∨ ~e2 and other statements one 
can construct at one’s will, like (~e1 & e2) ∨ (e1 & ~e2) ∨ (e1 & e2) and (~e1 
& ~e2) ∨ (e1 & e2),7 which are clearly not part of h’s content, prove all 
strict consequences of h. Notice finally that all these statements do con-
firm h in accordance with (HD1). Thus, for instance, on the grounds of 
(~e1 & ~e2) ∨ (e1 & e2), whenever ~e1 & ~e2 is verified, h is confirmed, 
which is completely unacceptable. 
 A seemingly promising strategy to settle such difficulties might be that 
of re-defining the notion of a strict consequence to the effect that q 
strictly follows from p if and only if both p and ~q are consistent and p 
entails each disjunct (individually taken) of the disjunction in Boolean 
normal form equivalent to q. Notice in fact that, if h entails e1 and e2, h 
does not entail each disjunct of the disjunction in Boolean form equiva-
lent to e1 ∨ ~e2; the same happens in all other unwanted confirmation 
cases considered above. Unfortunately, this easy loophole does not work, 
as so defined a notion of a strict consequence is actually too strict. This 
notion appears to fit well intuitive content relations between simple 
 
5 Probably, (TDP1) could be re-formulated to include couples of statements 
e1 and e2 that are not atomic. The present formulation is however sufficient to 
show the flaws in Grimes’ solution. 
6 More exactly, since h implies one of those disjuncts, (3) e1 ∨ ~e2 is a strict 
consequence of h. Moreover, since e1 confirms h in accordance with (HD1) and 
~e2 is not entailed by ~e1, (2) h and ~(e1 ∨ ~e2) prove each consistent. Thus, 
when (1) e1 ∨ ~e2 is true, in accordance with (HD1), e1 ∨ ~e2 confirms h. 
7 Notice that all these statements are already disjunctions in Boolean normal 
form. 
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logical conjunctions. For example, it is intuitive that Pa & Qa is part of the 
content of ∀x(Px & Qx) and, in this case, ∀x(Px & Qx) entails just each 
disjunct of the disjunction in Boolean form equivalent to Pa & Qa. Con-
sider however the following two statements that are not logical conjunc-
tions: ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx) and Pa ⊃ Qa. It is intuitive that Pa ⊃ Qa is part of the 
content of ∀x(Px ⊃ Qx), and yet the latter does not entail each disjunct of 
the disjunction in Boolean form equivalent to the former. Further exam-
ples similar to the latter can easily be produced.  
  I do not see any immediate ‘technical refinement’ of Grimes’ notion 
of a strict consequence or of (HD1) that could enable Grimes to over-
come the difficulties I have discussed in this paper. My conclusion is that 
Grimes’ solution of the tacking by disjunction problem is seriously flawed 
and it cannot be accepted. 
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